William L. Kovacs

August 10, 2026

Part III — Citizens United and the Rise of Corporate Political Power

From Artificial Entity to Political Actor. The decisive step in the evolution of corporate political power came with Citizens United. The case did not hold that corporations could make unlimited direct contributions to candidates. Federal law continues to restrict direct corporate contributions. Rather, the Court held that corporations and unions could not be prohibited from making independent expenditures advocating for or against candidates.

The Court reasoned that political speech is indispensable to democracy and that the First Amendment generally does not permit the government to restrict speech based on the speaker’s identity. It treated a corporate restriction as an impermissible suppression of political expression.

That reasoning largely eliminated the constitutional significance of the differences between a natural citizen and an artificial corporation.

A citizen has a finite lifespan, limited resources, and one vote. A corporation may exist perpetually, accumulate enormous amounts of capital, operate across national boundaries, and aggregate the economic resources of thousands or millions of shareholders, customers, and employees. Its political position is ordinarily selected by directors and executives, not by a vote of every person whose money contributes to the corporation’s wealth.

Corporations also benefit from state-created attributes unavailable to individuals: perpetual succession, limited liability of their owners, centralized management, transferable ownership, and the ability to amass resources over generations.

Those advantages may be economically useful. But when combined with constitutionally protected political expenditures, they produce political power that no ordinary citizen can match.

The issue is therefore not that corporations possess every constitutional right enjoyed by human beings. They do not vote, hold public office, or exercise rights that, by their nature, belong only to natural persons. The narrower and stronger objection is that corporations may exercise greater practical power in the political marketplace because their speech is backed by concentrated and potentially unlimited capital.

The Court speaks of equal freedom to express political views. The result is a profoundly unequal capacity to make those views heard.

Corporate speech becomes political power.

The constitutional premise is that political spending facilitates speech. Television advertisements, digital campaigns, consultants, polling, mailings, and mass communications all require money. Limiting expenditures therefore limits the amount and reach of political advocacy.

But recognizing that communication costs money does not resolve the central question: Whose constitutional speech is being protected? Whose constitutional speech is being diminished by the use of unlimited assets that support only what benefits the corporation, not the nation?

A corporation does not possess beliefs, conscience, civic duties, mortality, or an independent moral existence. Its officers and shareholders do, but the corporation is legally distinct from them. Indeed, the separation between the corporation and its owners is one of the principal benefits of incorporation.

The law cannot logically insist that the corporation is separate from its shareholders when limiting liability, but merely an association of citizens when expanding political rights.

Nor does the fact that Congress defines “person” to include corporations answer the constitutional question. The Dictionary Act provides that, unless context indicates otherwise, the words “person” and “whoever” in federal statutes include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, and individuals. That allows legislation to apply sensibly to organizations. It does not establish that every constitutional use of “person” includes every artificial entity, or that political rights attach regardless of the nature and purpose of the right involved.

The First Amendment protects “the freedom of speech,” not merely the rights of persons. That textual distinction gives the Court a serious argument for protecting expression regardless of its institutional source. Newspapers, nonprofit organizations, churches, advocacy groups, and incorporated associations all contribute to public debate.

But that argument should begin—not end—the constitutional inquiry. The Court must still distinguish protection for a press organization, membership association, or ideological nonprofit from the use of general corporate treasury funds accumulated through commercial activity. It must also confront the question of whether the state-created advantages of incorporation may be subject to state-defined conditions, particularly where corporate spending threatens to overwhelm rather than enrich citizen debate.

Corporate Personhood: Constitutional Doctrine Without Constitutional Text, Part I

Corporate Personhood: Constitutional Doctrine Without Constitutional Text, Part II

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